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Abstract
We present some rst-order probability logics. The logics allow making statements such as
P>s, with the intended meaning \the probability of truthfulness of  is greater than or equal to
s". We describe the corresponding probability models. We give a sound and complete innitary
axiomatic system for the most general of our logics, while for some restrictions of this logic we
provide nitary axiomatic systems. We study the decidability of our logics. We discuss some of
the related papers. c© 2000 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
In recent years there is a growing interest in uncertainty reasoning. A part of inves-
tigation concerns its formal framework { probability logics [1, 2, 5, 6, 9, 13, 15, 17{20].
Probability languages are obtained by adding probability operators of the form (in our
notation) P>s to classical languages. The probability logics allow making formulas such
as P>s, with the intended meaning \the probability of truthfulness of  is greater than
or equal to s". Probability models similar to Kripke models are used to give semantics
to the probability formulas so that interpreted formulas are either true or false. Every
world from a probability model is equipped with a probability space. The corresponding
probability measures are dened on sets of subsets of possible worlds.
In this paper we present some rst-order probability logics and explore their com-
pleteness issues. The most general of our logics (denoted by LFOP1) is similar to
the logic with probabilities on possible worlds [1, 9] which is appropriate for ana-
lyzing degrees of belief. It is proved in [1] that no complete nitary axiomatization
is possible for that logic, and also that even its monadic fragment is undecidable.
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We give an innitary axiomatic system for LFOP1 which we prove is sound and
complete. In this paper the terms nitary and innitary concern meta language only.
Object languages are countable, formulas are nite, while only proofs are allowed to be
innite.
We also put some restrictions on LFOP1 and investigate the resulting logics. The re-
strictions are of the following kinds: only probability measures with xed nite range
are allowed in models, only one probability measure on sets of possible worlds is
allowed in a model, the measures are allowed to be nitely additive, the set of mea-
surable sets of possible worlds can be precisely described, etc. It is interesting that
some of the logics obtained by the mentioned constraints have nitary axiomatization,
while some fragments are decidable.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 the most general of our
logics is introduced, and its syntax, semantics and axiomatization are given. Deni-
tions, formulations of statements and proofs from this section will be widely used in
the remaining sections. In Section 3 we consider the case when only probabilities with
xed nite range are allowed and give the corresponding axiomatization. In Section 4
an example which illustrates the relation between probability and modal logics is pre-
sented. In Section 5 we consider the case when only one probability measure on sets
of possible worlds is allowed. A further restriction of the rst-order probability logics
is given in Section 6 where some propositional probability logics are mentioned. In
Section 7 the decidability of the considered logics is discussed and a decidable frag-
ment of the probability logics is emphasized. We discuss some related papers in
Section 8.
2. The logic LFOP1
In this section we present the logic LFOP1 (L for logic, FO for rst-order, and P
for probability). We describe its syntax and some classes of models, give an innitary
axiomatization and prove that it is sound and complete with respect to the mentioned
classes of models.
2.1. Syntax
The language L of the LFOP1-logic is an extension of the classical rst-order
language. It is a countable set which contains for each nonnegative integer k, k-ary
relation symbols Pk0 ; P
k
1 ; : : : ; and k-ary function symbols F
k
0 ; F
k
1 ; : : : ; and the logical
symbols ^, and :, quantier 8, a list of unary probability operators P>s for every
rational number s2 [0; 1], variables x; y; z; : : : ; and parentheses. The function symbols
of the arity 0 are called constant symbols.
Terms and atomic formulas are dened as in the rst-order classical logic. The set
of formulas is the smallest set containing atomic formulas and closed under forma-
tion rules: if  and  are formulas, then :, P>s,  ^  and (8x) are formulas.
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For example, the following is a formula: P>s(8x)P11 (x)!P23 (y; F00 ) ^ P>rP>tP11 (F01 ).
A formula is called classical if it contains no probability operators. In this section
; ; ; : : : are used to denote formulas.
In a formula of the form (8x),  is said to be the scope of that quantier. An
occurrence of a variable x in a formula  is bound if it occurs in a part of  which is
of the form (8x). Otherwise, the occurrence is called free. A formula  is a sentence
if no variable is free in . If  is a formula and t is a term, then t is said to be free
for x in  if no free occurrences of x lie in the scope of any quantier (8y), where y
is a variable in t. If  is a formula, and x1; : : : ; xm are variables, (x1; : : : ; xm) indicates
that free variables of  form a subset of fx1; : : : ; xmg. If (x) is a formula, and t is a
term free for x in , then (t=x) denotes the result of substituting in  the term t for
all free occurrences of x. We will also use the shorter form (t) to denote the same
substitution.
We abbreviate: :(:^:) by (_), (:_) by (! ), ($ ) by ((! )^
(! )), :(8x): by (9x), :P>s() by P<s(), P>1−s(:) by P6s(), :P6s() by
P>s(), and P>s() ^ :P>s() by P=s().
2.2. Semantics
We use the possible-worlds approach to give semantics to probabilistic formulas. It
is similar to the objectual interpretation for rst-order modal logics [7].
A class H of subsets of a nonempty set V is an algebra if it contains V and is
closed under complementation and nite union. A nitely additive probability measure
 is a function from an algebra H to the real interval [0; 1] which satises: (V )= 1
and (H1 [ H2)= (H1) + (H2), for all disjoint sets H1; H2 2H . An algebra H is a
-algebra if it is closed under countable union. A function  is a probability mea-
sure if it maps a -algebra H to the real interval [0; 1] and satises: (V )= 1 and
(
S1
i=1Hi)=
P1
i=1 (Hi), for every disjoint sequence fHig of sets in H .
An LFOP1-model is a structure M = hW;D; I; Probi where:
 W is a nonempty set of objects called worlds,
 D associates a nonempty domain D(w) with every world w2W ,
 I associates an interpretation I(w) with every world w2W such that:
 I(w)(Fki ) is a function from D(w)k to D(w), for all i, and k,
 I(w)(Pki ) is a relation over D(w)k , for all i, and k.
 Prob is a probability assignment which assigns to every w2W a probability space,
such that Prob(w)= hW (w); H (w); (w)i, where:
 W (w) is a nonempty subset of W ,
 H (w) is an algebra of subsets of W (w) and
 (w) :H (w)! [0; 1] is a nitely additive probability measure.
Let M = hW;D; I; Probi be an LFOP1-model. A variable valuation v assigns some
element of the corresponding domain to every world w and every variable x, i.e.,
v(w)(x)2D(w). If w2W , d2D(w), and v is a valuation, then vw[d=x] is a valuation
like v except that vw[d=x](w)(x)=d.
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For a given LFOP1-model M = hW;D; I; Probi, and a valuation v the value of a term
t (denoted by I(w)(t)v) is:
 if t is a variable x, then I(w)(x)v= v(w)(x), and
 if t=Fmi (t1; : : : ; tm), then
I(w)(t)v= I(w)(Fmi )(I(w)(t1)v; : : : ; I(w)(tm)v).
The truth value of a formula  in a world w2W for a given LFOP1-model
M = hW;D; I; Probi, and a valuation v (denoted by I(w)()v) is:
 if =Pmi (t1; : : : ; tm), then I(w)()v=> if hI(w)(t1)v; : : : ; I(w)(tm)vi 2 I(w)(Pmi ),
otherwise I(w)()v=?,
 if =:, then I(w)()v=> if I(w)()v=?, otherwise I(w)()v=?,
 if =P>s, then I(w)()v=> if (w)fu2W (w): I(u)()v=>g>s, otherwise
I(w)()v=?,
 if =  ^ , then I(w)()v=> if I(w)()v=>, and I(w)()v=>, otherwise
I(w)()v=?, and
 if =(8x), then I(w)()v=> if for every d2D, I(w)()vw[d=x] =>, otherwise
I(w)()v=?.
A formula holds in a world w from a given LFOP1-model M = hW;D; I; Probi (de-
noted by (M;w) j= ) if for every valuation v, I(w)()v=>. If d2D(w), we will
use (M;w) j= (d) to denote that in model M = hW;D; I; Probi, for every valuation v,
I(w)((x))vw[d=x] =>.
A sentence  is satisable if there is a world w in an LFOP1-model M such that
(M;w) j= . A set T of sentences is satisable if there is a world w in an LFOP1-
model M such that for every 2T , (M;w) j= . A sentence  is valid if for every
LFOP1-model M , and every world w from M , (M;w) j= .
As an example consider the formula P>sP11(x), and suppose that for an LFOP1-model
M = hW;D; I; Probi, w2W , (M;w) j= P>sP11(x). By the above denition, this holds i
for every valuation v, I(w)(P>sP11(x))v=> i (M;w) j= (8x)P>sP11(x). On the other
hand, as we will show in Section 4, the satisability of the formula P>sP11(x) does not
imply the satisability of P>s(8x)P11(x).
In this paper we focus on the class of models that satises the following require-
ments:
 all the worlds from a model have the same domain, i.e., for all v; w2W ,
D(v)=D(w),
 for every sentence , and every world w from a model M the set fu2W (w):
I(u)()v=>g of all worlds from W (w) that satisfy  is measurable, and
 the terms are rigid, i.e., for every model their meanings are the same in all worlds.
We denote the class of all xed-domain measurable models with rigid terms by
 LFOP1;Meas.
We also consider two subclasses of LFOP1;Meas:
 LFOP1;All and
 LFOP1; .
A model M belongs to the former class if for every world w, H (w) is the power
set of W (w), i.e., if every subset of W (w) is (w)-measurable. A model M belongs
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to the later class if it is a -additive model, i.e., if for every world w from the model,
(w) is a -additive probability measure.
2.3. Axiomatic system
The axiomatic system Ax for LFOP1 contains the following axiom schemata:
(1) all the axioms of the classical propositional logic,
(2) (8x)(! )! (! (8x)), where x is not free in ,
(3) (8x)(x)! (t=x), where (t=x) is obtained by substituting all free occurrences of
x in (x) by the term t which is free for x in (x),
(4) P>0,
(5) P6r!P<s, s>r,
(6) P<s!P6s,
(7) (P>r ^ P>s ^ P>1(: _ :))!P>min(1; r+s)( _ ),
(8) (P6r ^ P<s)!P<r+s( _ ), r + s61
and inference rules:
(1) From  and !  infer .
(2) From  infer (8x).
(3) From  infer P>1.
(4) From !P>s−1=k, for every integer k>1=s, infer !P>s.
Let us briey discuss the above axiomatic system. Axioms 1{3 and inference rules
1 and 2 represent a sound and complete axiomatic system for the rst-order classical
logic. Any other equivalent system can be used. Axiom 4 announces that every formula
is satised by a set of worlds of the measure at least 0. By substituting : for  in
the axiom 4, the formula P>0:=P61 is obtained. The formula means that every
formula is satised by a set of worlds of the measure at most 1. Axioms 5 and 6 are
equivalent to
(50) P>r! P>s, r>s,
(60) P>s! P>s,
respectively. The monotonicity of the measure can be expressed by the formula
P>r!P>s, for r>s. As we will show in Theorem 2.3, it is a consequence of
axioms 5 and 6. Axioms 7 and 8 correspond to the property of the nite additivity of
measures. For example, in axiom 7, if sets of worlds that satisfy  and  are disjoint,
then the measure of the set of worlds that satisfy  _  is the sum of the measures
of the former two sets. As it is noted in [5], there is no need to have axioms that
correspond to the countable additivity, because it cannot be expressed in our language.
However, the axiomatic system Ax is sound and complete with respect to the class
LFOP1;  of models. Inference rule 3 can be considered as the rule of necessitation in
modal logics. The innitary inference rule 4 corresponds to the Archimedean axiom
for real numbers.
A formula  is a theorem (‘ ) if there is an at most countable sequence of formulas
0; 1; : : : ; , such that every i is an axiom or it is derived from the preceding formulas
by an inference rule. In this paper we will also use the notion of deducibility. A formula
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 is deducible from a set T of sentences (T ‘ ) if there is an at most countable
sequence of formulas 0; 1; : : : ; , such that every i is an axiom or a formula from
the set T , or it is derived from the preceding formulas by an inference rule, with the
exception that the inference rule 3 can be applied on the theorems only. A set T of
sentences is consistent if there are at least one formula which is not deducible from
T , otherwise T is inconsistent. A consistent set T of sentences is said to be maximal
consistent if for every sentence , either 2T or :2T .
2.4. Soundness and completeness
Theorem 1 (Soundness theorem). The axiomatic system Ax is sound with respect to
LFOP1;Meas; LFOP1;All and LFOP1;  classes of models.
Proof. Let L be any of the above-mentioned classes of models. We give only a sketch
of a straightforward but tedious proof. We can show that every instance of an axiom
schemata holds in every world of every L-model, while the inference rules preserve
the L-validity.
For example, let 0 be an instance of a classical propositional axiom  obtained by
substituting propositional letters by formulas. Suppose that the formula 0 is not valid,
i.e., that for some world w from an L-model M , and a valuation v, I(w)(0)v=?. It
follows that we can nd a classical propositional valuation  such that ()=?, a
contradiction. Let M = hW;D; I; Probi be an L-model, and w2W such that (M;w) j=
(8x)(x). It means that I(w)((8x)(x))v=> for every valuation v. Among these valua-
tions there must be one (denoted v0) which assigns to x the value d= I(w)(t)v. For this
valuation I(w)((x))v0 =>. Since I(w)((x))v0 = I(w)((t=x))v, we have I(w)((t=x))v
=> for every valuation. Thus, every instance of axiom 3 is valid. Note that the as-
sumptions about xed domains and rigidness of terms are crucial [9]. If it is not
the case, and (t=x) is of the form P>s(t=x), the term t refers to objects in other
worlds (dierent from w). It can have a consequence that I(w)((t=x))v=?. Axioms
4{8 concern the properties of measures from L-models and obviously hold in every
model. Inference rules 1 and 2 are validity-preserving for the same reason as in the
classical rst-order logic. Consider the inference rule 3 and suppose that a formula
 is L-valid. It must hold in every world from every L-model. For every L-model
M = hW;D; I; Probi, and w2W , the sets fu2W (w): (M; u) j= g and W (w) coincide.
Since (w)(W (w))= 1, it follows that (M;w) j= P>1. The inference rule 4 preserves
validity because of the properties of the set of rational numbers.
In the sequel of this section ? will be used to denote ^:, for an arbitrary formula
. Also, we will use L to denote an extension of the rst order probability language
L obtained by adding a countable set of new constant symbols to L.
In order to prove the completeness theorems for our logics, we show that every
consistent set of sentences is satisable. We begin with some auxiliary statements.
Then, we describe how a consistent set T of sentences can be extended to a suitable
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maximal consistent set, and how a canonical model can be constructed out of such
maximal consistent sets. Finally, we prove that for every world w from the canonical
model, a sentence  is satised in w if and only if 2w, and as a consequence we
obtain that the set T is satisable.
Theorem 2 (1) (Deduction theorem). If T is a set of sentences;  is a sentence; and
T [ fg ‘ ; then T ‘ ! .
(2) Let  and  be sentences. Then: ‘ P>1(! )! (P>s!P>s).
(3) Let  be a sentence. Then: ‘ P>r! P>s; r>s.
Proof. 1. We use the transnite induction on the length of the inference. The classical
cases follow as usual. Suppose that =P>1 is obtained from T[fg by an application
of inference rule 3. Then, ‘  and ‘ P>1 are theorems, and from ‘ ! (! ),
we obtain T ‘ ! . Suppose that =  ! P>s is obtained from T [ fg by an
application of the inference rule 4. Then:
T;  ‘ !P>s−1=k; for every integer k>1=s;
T ‘ ! (!P>s−1=k); for every integer k> 1=s; by the induction hypothesis;
T ‘ ( ^ )!P>s−1=k; for every integer k>1=s;
T ‘ ( ^ )!P>s; by the inference rule 4;
T ‘ ! :
2. The negation of the formula is equivalent to P>1(: _ ) ^ P61−s: ^ P<s.
Since, by the axiom 8, P61−s: ^ P<s! P<1(: _ ), and P<1=:P>1, we have
‘ :(P>1(! )! (P>s!P>s))!P>1(: _ ) ^ :P>1(: _ ). It follows that
‘ P>1(! )!(P>s!P>s).
3. By axioms 50 and 60, we have ‘ P>r!P>s, for r>s, and ‘ P>s!P>s. It
follows that ‘ P>r!P>s, for r>s.
In our proof a special kind of maximal consistent sets of sentences called saturated
sets [7] is needed. A set T of formulas is saturated if it is maximal consistent and
satises:
 if :(8x)(x)2T , then for some term t; :(t)2T .
A saturated extension of a consistent set T of sentences can be constructed as follows.
Theorem 3. Let T be a consistent set of sentences in the rst-order probability lan-
guage L; and C be a countably innite set of new constant symbols (C \ L= ;).
Then T can be extended to a saturated set T in the language L=L[C.
Proof. Let 0; 1; : : : ; be an enumeration of all sentences in L. We dene a sequence
of sets Ti; i=0; 1; 2; : : : such that:
(1) T0 =T ,
(2) for every i>0 if Ti [fig is consistent, then Ti+1 =Ti [fig,
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(3) for every i>0 if Ti [fig is not consistent, then Ti+1 =Ti [f:ig.
(4) if the set Ti+1 is obtained by adding a formula of the form :(8x)(x) to the set
Ti, then for some c2C, :(c) is also added to Ti+1, so that Ti+1 is consistent,
(5) if the set Ti+1 is obtained by adding a formula of the form :(!P>s), then
for some positive integer n; !:P>s−1=n, is also added to Ti+1, so that Ti+1 is
consistent, and
(6) T =
S
i Ti.
The sets obtained by steps 1 and 2 are obviously consistent. Step 3 produces consis-
tent sets, too. For if Ti; i ‘?, by the deduction theorem we have Ti ‘ :i, and since
Ti is consistent, so it is Ti [f:ig. Suppose that for some i>0, a formula of the form
:(8x)(x) is consistently added (in step 2 or 3) to the set Ti. If there is a constant sym-
bol c2C such that :(c)2Ti, then obviously Ti [f:(8x)(x);:(c)g is consistent.
Suppose that there is no such c. Since the set T does not contain any constant c2C,
and Ti [f:(8x)(x)g is obtained by adding only nitely many formulas to the set T ,
there is at least one constant c2C such that c does not appear in Ti [f:(8x)(x)g. If
Ti [f:(8x)(x);:(c)g is not consistent, then Ti;:(8x)(x) ‘ (c). Since c does not
appear in Ti [f:(8x)(x)g, we have Ti;:(8x)(x) ‘ (8x)(x), and Ti ‘ (8x)(x). It
follows that the set Ti is not consistent, because, by the hypothesis Ti [f(8x)(x)g is
not consistent, a contradiction. Thus, step 4 produces consistent sets. Consider step 5.
If Ti [f!P>sg is not consistent, then the set Ti can be consistently extended as it
is described above. Suppose that it is not the case. Then:
(1) Ti; :(!P>s); !:P>s−1=k ‘?, for every k>1=s, by the hypothesis,
(2) Ti; :(!P>s) ‘ :(!:P>s−1=k) for every k>1=s, by the deduction theorem,
(3) Ti; :(!P>s) ‘ !P>s−1=k for every k>1=s, from (2), by the classical tau-
tology :(! )! (!:),
(4) Ti;:(!P>s) ‘ !P>s, from (3), by the inference rule 4,
(5) Ti ‘ :(!P>s)! !P>s, from (4), by the deduction theorem,
(6) Ti ‘ !P>s.
Since Ti [f!P>sg is not consistent, from Ti ‘ !P>s it follows that Ti is not
consistent, a contradiction. Thus, step 5 produces consistent sets. Finally, consider the
set T obtained by step 6 of the construction. We can show that it is a deductively closed
set which does not contain all formulas, and as a consequence that T is consistent. First
note that for every sentence , if Ti ‘ , then it must be 2T . For if = k , and  62T ,
then Tmaxfi; kg+1 ‘  and Tmaxfi; kg+1 ‘ :, a contradiction. Let  be a sentence, and T ‘
. If the deduction of  from T is a nite sequence, then there is some i>0 such that
Ti ‘ , and 2T . Suppose that the sequence 1; 2; : : : ;  of formulas which forms the
proof of  from T is countably innite. We can show that for every i, if i is obtained
by an application of an inference rule, and all the premises of i belong to T , then
i 2T . Suppose i is obtained by the inference rule 1 (modus ponens) and its premises
1i and 
2
i belong to T . There must be some k such that 
1
i ; 
2
i 2Tk . Since Tk ‘ i, it
must be i 2T . The same explanation can be used to show that, if i is obtained by the
inference rule 2, then i 2T . If i is obtained by inference rule 3, then i is a theorem
and it must be i 2T . If it is not, then k =:i 2Tk+1, and Tk+1 is not consistent.
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Suppose that i= !P>s is obtained by innitary inference rule 4, and that the
premises 1i = !P>s−1=k; 2i = !P>s−1=(k+1); : : : belong to T . If !P>s 62T , by
step 5 of the construction of T , there is a j>1=s, such that !:P>s−1=j2T . Let
l= maxfk; jg. By axioms 5 and 6, !P>s−1=l2T , and !:P>s−1=l2T . There is
a set Tm which also contains these formulas. It follows that Tm [fg is not consistent,
and  62 T . There is some j such that :2Tj; Tj ‘ ! ?, Tj ‘ !P>s, and
!P>s2T , a contradiction. Thus, the set T is deductively closed. It does not contain
all formulas. If for some , both  and : belong to T , then there is some i60 such
that ;:2Ti, a contradiction because every Ti is consistent. Thus, T is consistent.
From steps 2 and 3 of the construction, it follows that the set T is maximal. Finally,
step 4 of the construction guaranties that T is saturated.
The next theorem summarizes some obvious properties of the saturated sets of sen-
tences.
Theorem 4. Let T be a saturated set of sentences. Let ; and  be sentences. Then
the following hold:
(1) If 2T ; then : 62T .
(2)  ^ 2T i 2T and 2T .
(3) If T ‘ ; then 2T ; i.e.; T is deductively closed.
(4) If 2T and ! 2T ; then 2T .
(5) If P>s2T ; and s>r; then P>r2T .
(6) If r is a rational number and r= supfs: P>s2Tg; then P>r2T .
Proof. As an example we prove 6. Let r= supfs: P>s2Tg. By the inference rule 4,
T ‘ P>r, and, since T is deductively closed set, P>r2T . The other cases follow
similarly.
Let the tuple M = hW;D; I; Probi, be dened as follows:
 W is the set of all saturated sets in the extended rst-order probability language L,
 D is the set of all variable-free terms in L,
 for every w2W; I(w) is an interpretation such that:
 for every function symbol Fmi ; I(w)(Fmi ) is a function from Dm to D such that for
all variable-free terms t1; : : : ; tm in L; Fmi : ht1; : : : ; tmi!Fmi (t1; : : : ; tm), and
 for every relation symbol Pmi ; I(w)(Pmi )= fht1; : : : ; tmi for all variable-free terms
t1; : : : ; tm 2L: Pmi (t1; : : : ; tm)2wg.
 For every w2W; Prob(w)= hW (w); H (w); (w)i such that:
 W (w)=W ,
 H (w) is a class of sets [] = fw2W : 2wg, for every sentence , and
 for every set A2H (w); (w)(A)= supfr: P>r2wg.
Theorem 5. Let M = hW;D; I; Probi be dened as above. Then; for every w2W;
H (w)= f[]g is an algebra of subsets of W (w).
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Proof. It is not hard to see that the following hold:
 W (w)= [ _ :]2H (w), for an arbitrary sentence ,
 if []2H (w), then the complement of [] is the set [:], and it belongs to H (w),
and
 if [1]; : : : ; [n]2H (w), then the union [1][    [ [n]2H (w) because [1][   
[ [n] = [1 _    _ n].
Thus, for every w, H (w) is an algebra of subsets of W (w).
The next theorem states that M is an LFOP1;Meas-model.
Theorem 6. Let M = hW;D; I; Probi be dened as above. Then; the following hold for
all sentences ; and ; and every w2W :
(1) If [] = []; then (w)([])= (w)([]);
(2) (w)([])>0;
(3) (w)([])= 1− (w)([:]); and
(4) (w)([][ [])= (w)([])+(w)([]); for all sentence  and  such that []\ []
= ;.
Proof. 1. It is enough to prove that [] [] implies (w)([])6(w)([]). From
[] [] it follows that ‘ :( ^ :), and ‘ P>1(! ). If P>s2w, then by
Theorem 2.2, P>s2w, and we conclude that (w)([])6(w)([]).
2. Since P>0 is an axiom, (w)([])>0.
3. Let r= (w)([])= supfs: P>s2wg. Suppose that r=1. Then, by Theorem 4.6
we have P>1=P60:=:P>0:, and :P>0:2w. If for some s>0; P>s:2w, by
the axiom 50 it must be P>0:2w, a contradiction. It follows that (w)([:])= 1.
Suppose that r<1. Then, for every rational number r0 2 (r; 1], :P>r0=P<r0, and
P<r02w. By axiom 6, P6r0 and P>1−r0(:) belong to w. On the other hand, if
there is a rational number r00 2 [0; r) such that P>1−r00(:)2w, then :P>r002w, a
contradiction. Hence, supfs: P>s(:)2wg=1− supfs: P>s2wg.
4. Let []\ [] = ;; (w)([])= r and (w)([])= s. Since [] [:], by step 3, we
have r+s6r+(1−r)= 1. Suppose that r>0, and s>0. By the well-known properties
of the supremum, and monotonicity (Theorem 2.3) for every rational number r0 2 [0; r),
and every rational number s0 2 [0; s), we have P>r0; P>s02w. It follows by axiom 7
that P>r0+s0( _ )2w. Hence, r + s6 supft: P>t( _ )2wg. If r + s=1, then the
assertion trivially holds. Suppose r + s<1. If r + s<t0 = supft: P>t( _ )2wg, then
for every rational number t0 2 (r + s; t0) we have P>t0( _ )2w. We can choose
rational numbers r00>r and s00>s such that: :P>r00; P<r002w, :P>s00; P<s00()2w,
and r00 + s00= t061. By axiom 6, P6r002w. Using axiom 8 we have P<r00+s00( _
); :P>r00+s00( _ ), and :P>t0( _ )2w, a contradiction. Hence, (w)([][ [])=
(w)([]) + (w)([]). Finally suppose that r=0 or s=0. Then we can reason as
above, with the only exception that r0=0 or s0=0.
Theorem 7 (Completeness theorem for LFOP1;Meas). Every consistent set T of sen-
tences has an LFOP1;Meas-model.
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Proof. Let T be a consistent set of sentences. In the above theorems we show that
M = hW;D; I; Probi is an LFOP1;Meas-model. By the induction on the complexity of
formulas we can prove that for every sentence , end every world w2W; (M;w) j= 
i 2w.
To begin the induction, let  be an atomic formula. Then, by the denition of
I(w); (M;w) j=  i 2w. Let =:. Then (M;w) j= : i (M;w) 6j=  i  62w i
:2w. Let = ^ . By Theorem 4.2, (M;w) j= ^  i (M;w) j=  and (M;w) j= 
i 2w and 2w i ^ 2w. Let =(8x). If 2w, then, because of the axiom 3,
(t)2w for every t 2D. By the induction hypothesis (M;w) j= (t) for every t 2D,
and (M;w) j= (8x). On the other hand, let  62w. Since w is saturated, there is some
t 2D such that (M;w) j= :(t). It follows that (M;w) 6j= (8x). Finally, let =P>s.
If 2w; supfr: P>r()2wg= (w)([])>s, and (M;w) j= P>s. For the other direc-
tion, suppose that (M;w) j= P>s, i.e., that supfr: P>r()2wg>s. If (w)([])>s,
then, by the well-known property of supremum and monotonicity of (w); P>s2w.
If (w)([])= s, then by Theorem 4.6, P>s2w.
In the last part of this section the canonical model M from Theorem 7 will be used
as a weak model, i.e., as a tool in proving completeness with respect to LFOP1;All and
LFOP1; .
Theorem 8 (Completeness theorem for LFOP1;All). Every consistent set T of sen-
tences has an LFOP1;All-model.
Proof. The proof can be obtained by applying the extension theorem for additive
measures [3] (‘Let C be an algebra of subsets of a set 
 and (w) a positive bounded
charge1 on C. Let F be an algebra on 
 containing C. Then there exists a positive
bounded charge (w) on F such that (w) is an extension of (w) from C to F and
that the range of (w) is a subset of the closure of the range of (w) on C.’) on
the measures (w) from the weak canonical model M . Thus, there are nitely additive
measures (w)’s dened on the power set of W that are extensions of the measures
(w)’s.
Theorem 9 (Completeness theorem for LFOP1; ). Every consistent set T of sentences
has an LFOP1; -model.
Proof. By the Loeb process and a bounded elementary embedding [15] we can trans-
form the weak canonical model M from Theorem 7 into a -additive probability model
M such that for every sentence  and every world w, (M;w) j=  i (M;w) j= .
The situation that the axiomatic system Ax is sound and complete with respect to
three dierent classes of models is similar to the one from the modal framework where,
1 A nitely additive measure is a charge.
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for example, the system K is characterized by the class of all models, but also by the
class of all irreexive models [12]. In other words, LFOP1-formulas cannot express the
dierences between the mentioned classes of probability models.
3. The logic LFOPFR(n)1
In this section we give a nitary sound and complete axiomatization with respect
to a class of models (denoted LFOPFR(n)1 ) satisfying that their measures have a nite
xed range.
Let n be a positive integer, and Range= f0; 1=n; : : : ; (n− 1)=n; 1g. If s2 [0; 1), then
s+ denotes minfr 2Range: s<rg. If s2 (0; 1]; s−= maxfr 2Range: s>rg. The set of
formulas and sets of models are dened as above, with the only exception that a tuple
M = hW;D; I; Probi is an LFOPFR(n)1 -model if
 (w) :H (w)!Range is a nitely additive probability measure with nite range
Range.
Note that LFOPFR(n)1 -models are given relatively to n, and that dierent choices
of n produce dierent logics. Similarly as above we dene the classes LFOPFR(n)1;Meas;
LFOPFR(n)1;All , and LFOP
FR(n)
1;  .
The axiomatic system AxFR(n) contains all the axioms from system Ax, and the
inference rules 1{3, as well as the following new axiom:
(9) P>s!P>s+.
Since the only innitary inference rule from Ax (4) is not included in AxFR(n), it is
a nitary axiomatic system. The notions of theorems and deducibility are dened as
above, with the important dierence that sequences of formulas that form deductions are
nite. Nevertheless, many statements from the previous section still hold. For example,
Theorems 1 and 2 can be proved as it is done above. The next theorem states that the
axiom 9 implies that the range of measures is the set Range.
Theorem 10. Let  be a sentence. Then:
(1) ‘ P<r!P6r−;
(2) ‘ P>r$P>r+;
(3) ‘ P6r−$P<r;
(4) ‘ _s2RangeP=s;
(5) ‘ _ s2RangeP=s; where _ denotes the exclusive disjunction.
Proof. 1. The considered formula is equivalent to axiom 9 because P>r=:P6r=
:P>1−r:=P<1−r:, and P>r+=P>1−(1−r+)=P61−r+:=P6(1−r)−:.
2. The formula is obtained from axioms 9, and 50.
3. The formula is obtained from the axiom 5, and Theorem 10.1.
4. From :P>1=P61, we have ‘ (P>1 _ :P>1) ^ :P>1. Thus, ‘ (P>1 ^
:P>1) _ (:P>1 ^ :P>1). From P>1 ^ :P>1=P=1, and ‘ P<1!P61, we
have ‘ P=1 _ P<1. From ‘ P<1$ ((P>1− _ :P>1−) ^ P<1); ‘ (P>s!P>s−)
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$ (P<s−!P<s), we have ‘ P<1$ ((P>1− ^ :P>1−) _ (P<1− ^ P<1)), and
‘ P=1 _ P=1− _ P<1−. In such a way we obtain ‘ (_s2RangeP=s) _ P<0. Since
‘ :P<0, we nally have ‘ _s2RangeP=s.
5. From P=r=P>r ^ :P>r, and the axiom 5, we have P=r!:P=s, for s>r.
Similarly, by the axiom 50, we have P=r!:P=s, for s<r. It follows that ‘ P=r!
:P=s, for r 6= s, and ‘ _ s2RangeP=s.
The completeness proofs for the LFOPFR(n)1;Meas; LFOP
FR(n)
1;All , and LFOP
FR(n)
1;  are similar
to the corresponding proofs from the previous section. In the sequel we sketch this
proof and emphasize some modied steps.
We begin as in Theorem 3, but do not use step 5. Then, Theorems 4.1{4.5 obvi-
ously hold, while Theorem 4.6 needs some explanation. By Theorem 10.5, the supre-
mum s of the set fr: P>r2Tg must be in the set Range. Also, for that s, it must
be P>s2T . Thus, Theorem 4.6 holds. A canonical model M = hW;D; I; Probi is in-
troduced as above. Note that for every w2W and every sentence ; supfr: P>r2wg is
the same as maxfr: P>r2w; r 2Rangeg, because the set Range is nite.
Theorems 5{9, can be proved for the LFOPFR(n)1;Meas, LFOP
FR(n)
1;All , and LFOP
FR(n)
1;  simi-
larly as it is done above.
The next theorem announces a property that does not hold for the systems considered
in the previous section.
Theorem 11 (Compactness theorem). Let L be any of the logics considered in this
section. Let T be a set of sentences. If every nite subset of T is L-satisable; then
T is L-satisable.
Proof. If T is not L-satisable, then it is not AxFR(n)-consistent. It follows that T ‘?.
Since the axiomatic system AxFR(n) is nitary one, there must be a nite set T 0T such
that T 0 ‘?. It is a contradiction because every nite subset of T is both L-satisable
and AxFR(n)-consistent.
4. Barcan formula
The relation between probability and modal logics is already investigated. In [4, 9]
the propositional case is considered, while in [13] the rst-order case is examined. It is
showed that probability and modal logics are closely related, but that modal necessity
(denoted by ) is a stronger notion than probability necessity (probability one, P>1).
In this section we give an, up to our knowledge, new example which assures this
conclusion.
Let us consider, the well-known Barcan formula of the rst-order modal logic:
BF (8x) (x)! (8x)(x):
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It is proved that BF holds in the class of all rst-order xed domain modal models,
and that it is independent from the other rst-order modal axioms [11]. However, the
behavior of the reminiscence of this formula:
BF(s) (8x)P>s(x)!P>s(8x)(x)
is quite dierent.
If s=0; BF(0) is valid, because P>0(8x)(x) is an instance of axiom 4.
Let us consider the class of xed-domain probability models (rigidness of terms and
measurability are not essential here). Suppose that 0<s<1, and consider the following
xed-domain model M1:
 W = fw1; w2; w3; w4g,
 D= fd1; d2g,
 (M1; w2) j= P11(d1), (M1; w2) 6j= P11(d2), (M1; w3) j= P11(d1), (M1; w3) j= P11(d2),
(M1; w4) 6j= P11(d1), (M1; w4) j= P11(d2),
 (w1)(w2)= 1=n, (w1)(w3)= s− 1=n (w1)(w4)= 1=n.
It is easy to see that (M1; w1) j= (8x)P>sP11(x), because (w1)(fw: w j= P11(d1)g)=
(w1)(fw2; w3g)= s, and (w1)(fw: w j= P11(d2)g)= (w1)(fw3; w4g)= s. On the other
hand, (M1; w1) 6j= (8x)P11(x), (M1; w2) 6j= (8x)P11(x), and (M1; w4) 6j= (8x)P11(x), whilst
(M1; w3) j= (8x)P11(x). Since (w1)(fw3g)= s − 1=n, (M1; w1) 6j= P>s(8x)P11(x). If
we consider the case of the LFOPFR(n)1 -logics and s2Range, then M1 belongs to the
class of xed domain probability models with measures with the nite range Range. If
s 62Range, then BF(s) is equivalent to BF(s+). Thus, for arbitrary s2 (0; 1), BF(s) is
not valid in any of the mentioned subclasses of LFOPFR(n)1 -models. Since LFOP
FR(n)
1 -
models are LFOP1-models, the same holds for the mentioned subclasses of LFOP1-
models.
Suppose that s=1 and consider the formula BF(1). Let M2 be the following xed-
domain probability model:
 W is countable set fw0; w1; w2; : : :g,
 D is countable set fd0; d1; d2; : : :g,
 for every i>0, (M2; wi) j= P11(dj) i i 6= j,
 the algebra H (w0) contains all nite subsets of W and all conite subsets of W (a
set is conite if its complement is nite),
 the measure (w0) is nitely additive and satises (w0)(A)= 0 for every nite set
A 2 H (w0), (w0)(A)= 1 for every conite set A 2 H (w0).
Obviously, for every wi 2W , wi 6j=(8x)P11(x), and (w0)(fw: (M2; w) j=(8xP11(x)g)
= 0. On the other hand, for every d2D, fw: (M2; w) j= P11(d)g is a conite set,
and (w0)(fw: (M2; w) j= P11(d)g)= 1. It follows that (M2; w0) j= (8x)P>1P11(x),
(M2; w0) 6j=P>1(8x)P11(x), and that the formula BF(1) does not hold in w0. Thus, it
is not valid with respect to any of the mentioned classes of nitely additive models.
It is easy to see that a similar construction (with uncountable sets W and D) can be
made if the measures are -additive, and that the formula BF(1) is not valid even in
-additive models.
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On the other hand, the formulas that correspond to the modal converse of the Barcan
formula (CBF (8x)(x)! (8x) (x)):
CBF(s) P>s(8x)(x)! (8x)P>s(x)
are theorems of the axiomatic systems Ax and AxFR(n), as well as CBF is in the modal
context [11]:
‘ (8x)(x)! (x);
‘ P>1((8x)(x)! (x)) by inference rule 3;
‘ P>s(8x)(x)!P>s(x) by Theorem 2.2;
‘ P>s(8x)(x)! (8x)P>s(x) by inference rule 2:
5. The logic LFOP2
The models of type 2 described in [9] are similar to our LFOP1-models. However,
type 2 models satisfy that for all worlds w1, w2 from a model M the corresponding
measures (w1) and (w2) coincide. As a consequence, the formula (in our notation)
!P>1, where no function and relation symbols appear in  except in the scope
of a probability operator P>s, is valid. Informally speaking, it means that formulas
expressing probabilities either hold in every world from a model or they are not satis-
able in that model. In our opinion, such a situation can be better handled in another
way. We will retain the condition that in every model there is only one measure, and
restrict the probability formulas such that only formulas without iteration of probability
operators are allowed.
5.1. Syntax
We use the same rst-order probability language L as above, dene terms and rst-
order classical formulas as usual, but limit the formation rules for probability formulas.
Namely, we do not allow either that there are nested probability operators in formulas
or that formulas are boolean combinations of classical formulas and formulas with
leading probability operators. Let us denote the set of all classical rst-order formulas
by ForC, formulas from ForC by ; ; : : : . The set ForP of all probability formulas
will be dened as follows. If 2ForC, then P>s is a basic probability formula. The
set of all probability formulas is the least set ForP containing all basic probability
formulas, and closed under formation rules: if A; B2ForP, then :A, A ^ B2ForP. In
other words, only boolean combinations of basic probability formulas are allowed. Let
formulas from ForP will be denoted by A; B; : : : ; ForC [ForP by For, and formulas
from For by , 	,: : : For example, :P>s ^ P>r(! ) is a syntactically correct
formula, while P>sP>r and (P>r)!  are not.
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5.2. Semantics
An LFOP2-model is a structure M = hW;D; I; H; i where:
 W is a nonempty set of objects called worlds,
 D is a function which assigns to every w2W a domain D(w),
 I is a function which assigns to every w2W a classical interpretation I(w),
 H is an algebra of subsets of W , and
  is a nitely additive probability measure, : H ! [0; 1].
Worlds from an LFOP2-model can be viewed as classical rst-order models such that
every world w possesses its own domain D(w) and interpretation I(w), while the
corresponding measure  is dened on an algebra of sets of these classical models. In
this section we do not require that terms are rigid.
The values of terms and classical formulas are dened as it is done in Section 2.
Let M be an LFOP2 model and  a classical sentence. The set of worlds from M that
satisfy  is denoted by []M . We will omit the subscript M from []M and write [],
if M is clear from the context. An LFOP2-model M is measurable if [] is measurable
for every classical sentence . Similarly as above, we can dene the subclasses of
LFOP2: LFOP2;Meas, LFOP2;All, and LFOP2;. Let L be any of these classes of models.
The satisability relation between models and sentences from For fullls the following
conditions for every LFOP2-model M = hW;D; I; H; i:
 if 2ForC, M j=  if (8w 2 W )(M;w) j= ,
 M j= P>s if ([])>s,
 if A2ForP, M j= :A if M 6j= A, and
 if A; B2ForP, M j= A ^ B if M j= A and M j= B.
A set T of sentences is L-satisable if there is an L-model M such that every
sentence from T is satised in M . A sentence  is L-valid if it is satised in every
L-model.
Note that in contrast to the denition from Section 2, the satisability relation is
not dened between worlds and formulas. Also note that the classical formulas do not
behave in the usual way. For some classical sentences  and  and a model M it can
be M j= _, but that neither M j= , nor M j= . Similarly, it can be simultaneously
M 6j=  and M 6j= :. Nevertheless, the set of all classical sentences that are valid
with respect to the above given semantics and the set of all classical valid sentences
coincide, because every world from an arbitrary LFOP2-model is a classical rst-order
interpretation.
5.3. Axiomatic system
It is interesting that a sound and complete axiomatization with respect to the mention
classes of models can be given by the axiomatic system Ax from Section 2. Of course,
instances of axiom schemata must obey the syntactical restrictions that hold in this
section.
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5.4. Soundness and completeness
We follow the general pattern of the corresponding proofs from Section 2. Theorems
1,2.2, and 2.3 can be proved as it is done there. We have to change the formulation
of Theorem 2.1 only, because of the formation rules for the considered logics:
Theorem 12 (Deduction theorem). If T is a set of sentence;  a sentence; and
T[fg ‘ 	; then T ‘ !	; where  and 	 are either both classical or both
probability formulas.
A canonical model M is dened as follows: Let T be a consistent set of sen-
tences, clconseq(T ) the set of all classical sentences that are consequences of T , and
A0; A1; : : : ; an enumeration of all probability sentences. We dene a sequence of sets
Ti, i=0; 1; 2; : : : ; such that:
(1) T0 = T [ clconseq(T )[fP>1: 2 clconseq(T )g,
(2) for every i>0, if Ti [fAig is consistent, then Ti+1 =Ti [fAig, otherwise, Ti+1 =Ti
[f:Aig,
(3) if Ai=B!P>s, and Ti [fAig is not consistent, then Ti+1 =Ti [f:(B!P>s);
B!:P>s−1=ng, for some positive integer n, such that Ti+1 is consistent.
(4) T =
S
i Ti.
The set T is used to construct a tuple M = hW;D; I; f[]:  is a classical sentenceg;
; i, where:
 W = fw: w j= clconseq(T )g contains all the classical rst-order interpretations that
satisfy the set clconseq(T ) of all classical consequences of the set T ,
 D(w) is the domain of the interpretation w,
 I(w) is the interpretation w,
 for every classical sentence , [] denotes the set fw2W : w j= g, and
 : f[]:  is a classical sentenceg! [0; 1] such that ([])= supfs: P>s2Tg.
The consistency of the sets Ti’s and T , and the counterparts of Theorems 4{6 can
be proved similarly as it is done in Section 2. Thus, M is an LFOP2;Meas-model.
In the proof of the counterparts of Theorem 7 only one step must be changed. In or-
der to show that a consistent set T has an LFOP2;Meas-model, we should prove that for
every sentence , M j=  i 2T . It can be done using the induction on the complex-
ity of formulas. If  is a classical sentence, and 2 clconseq(T ), then by the denition
of M , M j= . Conversely, let M j= . By the completeness of the classical rst-order
logic (clconseq(T ) j=  i clconseq(T ) ‘ ), 2 clconseq(T ). The other cases, as well
as the counterparts of Theorems 8 and 9, can be proved as it is done in Section 2.
Note that in the construction of the canonical model it is not required that for every
classical sentence  at least one formula from f;:g must be in T . This request
would imply a degenerated model in which every classical sentence has the same truth
value in every world, and consequently that either [] = 1 or [] = 0.
Note that it is possible to consider the systems LFOPFR(n)2 such that only formulas
without iteration of probability operators and only the models with the measure with
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xed nite range are allowed. A nitary axiomatization for LFOPFR(n)2 systems is given
in [19].
6. Propositional case
We can go further and restrict our logics to be propositional. The corresponding
models are obvious restrictions of the rst-order probability models. According to the
above described procedure we can consider the following systems:
 LPP1 (L for logic, rst P for propositional, and second P for probability), such that
rules for making formulas allows unrestricted iteration of probability operators, and
the class of probability models contains models with measures with ranges [0; 1],
 LPPFR(n)1 , a restriction of LPP1, such that only models with xed nite range Range
are allowed,
 LPP2, such that only formulas without iteration of probability operators are allowed,
and
 LPPFR(n)2 , a restriction of LPP2, such that only models with xed nite range Range
are allowed, and the classes of measurable models, models where every set of pos-
sible worlds is measurable, and -additive models.
Innitary axiomatic systems for LPP1 and LPP2 can be obtained from the system
Ax by removing the rst-order axioms 2 and 3 and the inference rule 2 from Ax.
The completeness proofs are almost identical to the corresponding proofs in the pre-
vious sections. Finitary axiomatic systems for LPPFR(n)1 , and LPP
FR(n)
2 are given in
[14, 17, 19, 20].
7. Decidability
The logics from Sections 2 and 3 contain the classical rst-order logic. Thus, they are
undecidable. The monadic fragments of the considered systems are undecidable, too.
To show that, we can use the procedure due to Kripke [11, 16]. There is a translation
of classical rst-order formulas that contain only one binary relation symbol P2 to
monadic probability formulas such that a classical rst-order formula is valid if and
only if its translation is a valid probability formula. The translation replaces every
expression of the form P2(t1; t2) in a classical formula by (P11(t1) ^ P12(t2)). Since
the fragment of the classical rst-order logic with a single binary relation symbol is
not decidable, the same holds for the monadic fragments of the rst-order probability
logics with iterations of probability operators.
Similarly, the logics from Section 5 are undecidable. However, their monadic frag-
ments are decidable. It can be proved, using propositional reasoning, that every formula
A2ForP can be equivalently transformed to a formula
DNF (A)=
mW
i=1
kiV
j=1
P>si; j i; j ; (1)
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called a disjunctive normal form of A, where P>si; j is either P>si; j or :P>si; j , and
i; j’s are classical rst-order formulas. The formula A is satisable if at least one of
disjuncts from DNF (A) is satisable. If A is a monadic sentence, so it is every i; j. Let
us consider an arbitrary disjunct Di=
Vki
j=1P>si; j i; j and an LFOP2 (or LFOPFR(n)2 )
model M = hW;D; I; H; i. We can suppose, without loss of generality, that all quanti-
ers in Di refer to dierent variables. Let mi be the number of dierent variables in
Di. In every world holds exactly one conjunction
Vki
j=1i; j. It is well known that a
classical monadic formula with m variables is satisable if and only if it is satisable
in a model of cardinality 2m. For every world w2W we consider a classical rst-
order model w0=(D(w0); I(w0)) such that D(w0) contains 2m elements and I(w0) j=
Vki
j=1i; j if and only if w j=
Vki
j=1i; j. For the model M we can construct a model
M 0= hW 0; D0; I 0; H 0; 0i whose worlds are the considered classical rst-order models.
Note that the domains of the worlds from M 0 are of the cardinality 2m. A set H 01 belongs
to the algebra H 0 if and only if there is a set H1 2H such that w0 2H 01 if and only if
w2H1. The measure 0 is dened such that for all H1 2H , H 01 2H 0, 0(H 01)= (H1).
It follows that M 0 j= Di if and only if M j= Di. Let d1; d2; : : : ; d2m denote the elements
in the domains of worlds from M 0. Let c1; c2; : : : ; c2m be a sequence of 2m new constant
symbols. The denition of M 0 is extended so that for every w0, I(w0)(ci)=di. For every
i; j we consider a formula #i; j without quantiers which contains variable-free for-
mulas only. Namely, we replace every universal quantier by a conjunction, and every
existential quantier by a disjunction of variable-free formulas. For example, a formula
of the form (8x)P11(x) ^ (9y)P12(y) can be replaced by
V2m
k=1 P
1
1(ck) ^ (
W2m
k=1 P
1
2(ck)).
Since domains of worlds from M 0 are nite, for every w0 2W 0, w0 j= i; j if and only if
w0 j= #i; j. Thus, M j= Di if and only if #Di= Vkij=1P>si; j#i; j is satisable in M 0.
Since variable-free formulas can be treated as propositional formulas, the satisability
of the monadic rst-order probability formula A is reduced to the satisability of the
propositional probability formula
Wm
i=1 #D
i. In contrast to the most of the rst-order
probability logics, the propositional logics are decidable [5, 6, 17, 19, 20]. The decision
procedure reduces a probability propositional formula to a nite number of systems of
linear equalities and inequalities such that the formula is satisable if and only if at
least one of the systems is solvable. Since the later is decidable, so it is the former.
Thus, the monadic fragments of the rst-order logics without iterations of probability
operators are decidable.
8. The related works
In this paper we have investigated some rst-order probability logics. We have
given the corresponding axiomatic systems that are sound and complete with re-
spect to some classes of probability models. As we have already noted this is not
the rst paper to consider probability logics. The rst-order case, and the proposi-
tional case are studied in [1, 2, 9, 13, 15, 19] and in [5, 6, 14, 17{20], respectively. In
this section we will compare our approach to the approaches from some of these
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papers, and will suggest how to adapt our systems to these dierent frame-
works.
The reader can observe that the syntax presented in Section 2 diers from the
one described in [1, 9]. The main dierence concerns allowing the so-called eld
terms that range over the reals and represent probabilities. For example, (8r)((06
r6 12 )! (9y)P>rP(y)) is a well-dened formula in [1, 9]. Also, probability terms of
the form w() and atomic probability formulas of the form
Pn
i=1 aiw(i)>b are al-
lowed there. A formula w()>s can be rewritten (in our notation) as P>s. These
restrictions are made here for ease of exposition only. Our syntax can be extended in
a straightforward manner, such that the set of well formed formulas from [1, 9] can
be exactly obtained. Reasoning about eld terms and about linear inequalities can be
formalized using the axiomatization for real closed elds, and the axiomatization for
reasoning about linear inequalities, respectively [5]. It is shown in [1] that the set of
valid formulas of the logic with probabilities on possible worlds is not recursively
enumerable. Thus, no nitary axiomatization is possible. By extending the axiomatic
system Ax with the axioms for real closed elds and linear inequalities, an innitary
axiomatization of that logic can be obtained. Finitary axiomatizations for some frag-
ments of the logic with probabilities on possible worlds can be acquired by substituting
AxFR(n) for Ax in this extended axiomatic system. In [18] other probability operators
of the form QF are introduced. The intended meaning of QF is that the probability
of truthfulness of  belongs to the set F [0; 1]. It can be shown that in a general
case neither QF -operators are denable from P>s-operators, nor P>s-operators are de-
nable from QF -operators. It can be interesting to nd the complexity of the logic with
probabilities on possible worlds extended by these new types of operators.
The assumptions about xed domains and rigidness of terms in Section 2 are im-
portant. It is well known that if they do not hold, some anomalies appear [7, 9]. For
example, the classical rst-order axiom (8x)! (t=x), where the term t is free for x,
is not valid. We can consider some other classes of models by dropping these limita-
tions. If we allow world relative domains and nonrigid terms, we can follow [7] and
obtain complete axiomatic systems according to the ideas given there.
Models with only one discrete probability measure are considered in [1, 9]. The
LFOP2 logic has been suggested in Section 5 as a suitable approach under the assump-
tion that only one probability measure is allowed in a model. The similar logics have
been already given for the rst-order case (with measures with nite ranges) in [19],
and for the propositional case in [5, 18{20]. With some modications of the axiomatic
systems given here we can handle the case when discrete probability measures (i.e.
when every singleton is measurable) are used. For example, an inference rule similar
to the irreexivity rule given in [8] should be used. Such a rule guaranties that every
world is witnessed by a particular formula, and that every singleton is measurable.
Finitary axiomatizations are obtained if the considered classes of models contain only
models whose measures have a xed nite range. The similar approach is given in [19]
for the rst-order probability case, and in [14, 17, 19, 20] for propositional probability
logics.
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Propositional probability logics are considered in [5, 6, 14, 17{20]. In [5, 6] a nitary
axiomatic system for logics that are similar to LPP1, and LPP2 is given. However,
the compactness theorem does not hold for LPP1 and LPP2 (neither it does for the
logics from [5, 6]). Consider the set T = f:P=0g[ fP<1=n: n is a positive integerg.
Although every nite subset of T is satisable, the set T itself is not. Since the
compactness theorem follows easily from the extended completeness theorem (\every
consistent set of formulas is satisable"), we cannot hope for the extended completeness
when we have nitary axiomatic systems for LPP1 and LPP2. Indeed, in [5, 6] only
the simple completeness (\every consistent formula is satisable") is proved. There
is another unpleasant consequence of nitary axiomatization for LPP1 and LPP2. The
above set T is consistent with respect to the axiomatic systems given in [5, 6] (because
all its nite subsets are consistent and deductions are nite sequences), while the set
T has no model. It seems that the only way to avoid consistency of the set T is to
employ innitary logic as we have done here. Since the compactness does hold for
LPPFR(n)1 and LPP
FR(n)
2 , these systems have nitary axiomatizations [14, 17, 19, 20].
It is shown in [1] that the set of sentences valid with respect to type 2 models, as well
as some restricted classes of the set (monadic formulas, for example), is not decidable.
It is also proved that such undecidability results hold if only nitely additive measures
with rational values are allowed. Thus, our examples of some decidable subclasses of
LFOP2 formulas form a contrast to these negative results.
Finally, note that there is another kind of rst-order probability logics, the so-called
logic with the probability on the domain [1, 2, 9, 15, 20], which is suitable for repre-
senting and reasoning with statistical knowledge. There is a translation between two
kinds of logics, described in [1], which is used to show that the logics are equally
expressive.
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